But...there's no reason to think this is the case- there's no evidence of it, and it's not entailed by accepted theory.
But there’s no reason to assume that it isn’t the case either. It’s a possibility, so having an understanding of what we don’t know helps us to not make assumptions, or broad brush conclusions about the world and existence. — Punshhh

You're right. My issue is how one uses possibilities in further reasoning. Conpiracy theories begin with a possibility. It's possible some vaccine increases the liklihood of autism. It would be irrational to reject vaccines solely on the basis of this possibility. It would be rational to examine data to look for correlations.

The ‘subject’ at issue is not you viewed objectively; it is the subject or observer for whom anything can appear as ‘a world’ at all. — Wayfarer

Of course the subject is me! It's a different perspective - but a different perspective of the same me. It's like working in building: you know the building from the perspective of an occupant - where the toilets are, the carpet colors, knowledge of other occupants, etc. Someone who never worked in this building will not have this insider perspective, but you would be able to understand his perspective - one based on external appearances. These 2 perspectives have no ontological significance - what's different is the background knowledge and context.

By re-describing the ‘I’ entirely from the third-person standpoint, you’ve already shifted back into the objective stance and thereby bracketed out the very role of subjectivity that is in question.

Acknowledging my subjectivity does not undercut my beliefs about things that exist. If one believes X exists, then one believes this to be objective fact. Pointing to the phenomenology doesn't undercut anyone's beliefs about what exists. It only raises the possibility of having false beliefs about reality, and possibility alone is of no epistemic value - beyond the modal truth.

I have the capacity to consider myself from a 3rd person perspective, but that's all it is: a perspective. It's an exercise in considering the world at large, and my place in it. It has no ontological significance - except to the degree that having this cognitive capacity needs to be accounted for ontologically.

In terms of my building analogy, I'm the sole occupant of me. I have internal knowledge of me that is unavailable to anyone else. But I can still consider myself from an outsider's perspective. It doesn't imply an ontological distinction, just a difference of background knowledge and context.

Nearly everyone on earth does this implicitly!
— Relativist

Right! Which is why it's so hard to argue against. — Wayfarer

What I'm looking for is your own epistemic justification to believe what you do. You previously shared the common view - it was a belief you held. Somehow, your old beliefs were supplanted. You make much of the phenomenology; if that were the sole basis, it would be irrational - it would be dropping a belief because it's possibly false. So there must be more than that. This is what I'm asking you to explain.

it's not a 'problem to be solved'. It's not that 'nobody can describe pain satisfactorily'. It's being pointed to as an 'explanatory gap' - 'look, no matter how sophisticated your scientific model, it doesn't capture or convey the felt experience of pain, or anything other felt experience.' So there's a fundamental dimension of existence that is left out of objective accounts. — Wayfarer

I think you mean that third-person descriptions cannot convey knowledge of pain. This is Mary's room. Knowledge of pain and other qualia is a knowledge of experience. Nevertheless, it IS an explanatory gap that a complete ontology should account for. You talk around the issue in vague terms, by (I think) implying there's something primary about first-person-ness. Does that really tell us anything about ontology? It's not an explanation, it's a vague claim that you purport to be central. Obviously, 1st person experience is central to a first-person perspective. It's also the epistemic foundation for understanding the world. But it seems an unjustified leap to suggest it is an ontological foundation - as you seem to be doing.

the “I” that is the subject of experience — the subject to whom qualia appear, the one that is doing the thinking right now — is not itself an object within the field of objects. It is the condition for there being a field of objects at all. You never encounter this “I” as a thing in the world in the way you encounter tables, neurons, or even brain scans. It is always on the experiencing side of the relation. — Wayfarer

"I" refers to a single, specific identity - I am an individual with this unique identity, distinct from all other identities. I have perceptions and experiences; I interact with the world beyond me - the world I am a part of. My experiences are distinct from yours; your experiences take place when and where your body is are, mine take place when and where my body is. What part of this do you disagree with?

So when you say:

"I am an objective existent. I engage in mental activities; I experience qualia."

you are illicitly fusing:

The organism that can be studied objectively, and

The subjectivity in virtue of which anything is experienced at all. — Wayfarer

I'm "Illicitly fusing?! You seem to implying my view is the idiosyncratic one. Hardly. Nearly everyone on earth does this implicitly! You have devised a dichotomy that is counterintuitive - at odds with our innate view of ourselves and the world - you need to make the case for why the intuitive/innate view is wrong, and your claims are correct. It seems unnecessarily complex - you need a reason to embrace this complexity over a simpler, more intuitive view.

Those are not the same ontological role. The first is an object in experience; the second is what makes experience possible in the first place.

I think we agree that "what makes experience possible" is "the mind" (irrespective of what this refers to). And yet, you propose some vague dichotomy - seemingly contradicting the law of identity.

You mentioned a "field of objects" , seemingly refering specifically to my mental image/understanding of the objects around me. That much would be fine, but nevertheless - I believe this mental "field of objects" corresponds to actual objects around me. Do you consider this wrong? If so, then explain why you would deny this intuitive (and innate) belief.

You refer to an "ontological role". Generally speaking, a role is contextual: it relates an object to some aspects(s) of the rest of the world. "Parent" is a role that a person plays with respect to his children. "Food" is a role a bull might play, to people who eventually consume him. If you don't mean it this way, then you need to define what you mean by, "role".

It goes like this, there are minds with technology on earth which emerged naturally. Presumably there are other planets with minds with technology. Due to temporal variation in the development of planets and minds, there are likely to be minds far more advanced, in terms of technology (not to mention what’s going on in those other possible universes) than us. If minds are where artificial things come from (as in the example of humans), there could be highly advanced artificial things around. How do we know there aren’t artificial worlds, spacetime bubbles, universes out there? How do we know our world (known universe) isn’t artificial?
2h — Punshhh

One can justifiably believe there are non-earthly minds elsewhere in the universe, based on naturalism being true - which implies abiogenesis occurred: this implies the probability of minds coming into existence has a probability> 0. The universe is vast, and old, so it is reasonable to believe it's occurred multiple times. One or more may have created artificial worlds. Of course, it's possible, and it's a viable science fiction theme. But...there's no reason to think this is the case- there's no evidence of it, and it's not entailed by accepted theory.

Such speculations can sometimes lead to important investigations that uncover new facts. I'm not at all suggesting that we should treat speculations as necessarily false. They are, and should remain, possibilities.

And the thing is, you acknowledge this. You've said in many places, yes, physicalism can't account for the nature of mind. — Wayfarer

You can't justify your view on the sole basis that physicalism is false*.

The mind - neither mine, nor yours, nor anyone else's should they be in this room - is not an objective existent. — Wayfarer

However I am an objective existent. I engage in mental activities; I experience qualia. As I suggested, and you did not dispute: "the mind" is conceptually that aspect of myself that engages in mental activities. You have not reconciled the fact that I am an objective existent with your claim that "the mind" is not.

it is categorically, or ontologically, of a different order to existent things. — Wayfarer

This is vague. Describe these various ontological categories.
_____________
*I have never claimed everything will one day be solved.

What I've acknowledged is that physicalism, narrowly defined, does not account for qualia very well. But the most modest leap from this is an extended physicalism that adds some aspect of reality not otherwise detectable that accounts for the explanatory gap.

what we don’t know looms large to me. And yet you are sort of restricting what is natural to what has been deemed to be so by human thought. While we have no metric by which to measure how much of our world we know about and therefore, the extent of our ignorance. — Punshhh

It seems reasonable to believe there's a great deal we don't know. But what use can be made of this fact? Does it lead anywhere?

Well we have one example of a mind existing. Something which is naturally emergent in biological life. So it seems reasonable to allow the possibility of other minds, creating other artificial things. Including highly advanced technologies. Which might for example have technology to control physical material, energy etc.
I say this because it seems reasonable to consider that human technology will be able to do such things in the future — Punshhh

Regarding other "minds", IMO we can justifiably believe they exist in other humans, and in a diminished sense- in other animals.

But sure, it's fine to speculate about what we might create. Speculation can lead to discovery and invention. I also do not insist that empirical evidence is necessary to believe that something exists. Example: we can justifiably infer that there is life elsewhere in the universe.

Universes not causally connected, could include infinite universes entirely different to ours. But which is somehow constrained by human thought. If not a gap, a leaky sieve. — Punshhh

I covered that by referencing "anything inferred to exist by analysis of the universe", which means via accepted theory.

I intentionally leave out mere possibilities. My definition is intended to identify what we can justifiably believe. This also applies to:

Do we know there are not artificial things outside the human mind? — Punshhh

'. I'm not really seeing how this runs against anything else said though - anything discovered would ne 'natural'. If there is some 'non-physical' reality of some kind, or some sort of film between us and reality that necessarily negates the objectivity of what we see, that is also natural. — AmadeusD

The notion of something "between us and reality" is self-contradictory. Perhaps you mean "between us and the rest of reality". My problem here is that you seem to be posing a mere possibility. I grant naturalism (as I've defined it) is possibly false, but mere possibility doesn't undercut believing naturalism to be true, in the provisional sense I have in mind.

The very best scientific theories are possibly false, but that mere possibility is not a good reason to believe it false.

This might need tidying up a bit. You might have left a big hole there for other things to sneak in. — Punshhh

What hole do you have in mind?

I would define natural as everything except what is made up in peoples heads. Putting the emphasis on the human mind, the only place where artificial things are created.

That's tricky. Our knowledge of the world is in our heads, and that is (in a sense) made up - even though it corresponds to reality.

By analysis of the universe I presume you mean by means of the scientific method predominantly. — bert1

Most of our knowledge of the universe comes from science, but there are potential additional sources of knowledge- such as knowledge derived from conceptual analysis. So it's best to leave this open.

Is the 'laws of nature' bit essential to naturalism? — bert1

It's essential to the naturalistic metaphysics I know and defend, but one could instead depend on Humean regularities (each causal action is unique). IMO, (non-Platonic) laws make the most sense.

Say what you will about Mamdani. but he must a world class ass kisser. — Wayfarer

Trump got nothing out of it, that I can see. GOP had been trying to paint Mandami as a "Communist" and claim this is the direction Democrats are taking. Trump gave the dems soundbights in which Trump praises Mandami's intelligence and that he agees with him on many things. Meanwhile, Mandami did not back off from calling Trump a fascist.

If you say something is 'natural', what have you said about it? — bert1

I'll give you my definition:

The natural= That which exists (has existed, or will exist) starting with oneself, everything that is causally connected to ourselves, and anything not causally connected (such as alternate universes) that is inferred to exist, to have existed, or that will exist, through analysis of the universe.


Naturalism is a metaphysical system that assumes the totality of reality is natural. The "natural" is anything that exists that is causally connected to the actual physical world through laws of nature.

I feel exactly the same level of passion as Wayf does about avoiding people who claim its either sorted, or all-but-sorted — AmadeusD

Withholding judgement is perfectly reasonable. Nevertheless, it is not UNreasonable to make a judgement. My judgement is that naturalism is the inference to best explanation, as an overall metaphysical theory. So, I "believe" naturalism is true - basically I see no good reason to think anything unnatural exists. This is not an expression of certainty - I'm open to having this theory challenged and defeated. But the mere possibility it is false is not a defeater.

Unclear what you might hope to accomplish by taking this stance. — noAxioms

. My initial statement on the issue said it all:

In terms of ontology, things have properties, processes do not have properties. You may have meant it in a de dicto sense. Regardless, we agree consciousness is a process. — Relativist

Beyond that, I was just explaining what I meant.

Vapor pressure is not a property of boiling? — noAxioms

No. It's a property of the material. I'm referring to the intrinsic properties of existents. Everything that exists has intrinsic properties.

Unclear what you might hope to accomplish by taking this stance. — noAxioms

Clarity on ontology.

One could say that "red has the property of being in a wavelength range of X-Y" but it's just way of talking. Red isn't a thing. Rather, the word "red" corresponds to wavelength range of X-Y.

One could refer to speed as a property of running. But speed is actually a property of the runner (or more precisely: a relation between the runner and the earth).

If consciousness is a physical process, what are the answers to these kinds of questions? — Patterner

Neuron firings, changes to action potentials, release of chemicals, other bodily activities. Of course, none of these measures apply to what we consider thought processes. But that would require knowing exactly how thoughts are produced in a brain.

Personally I suspect consciousness is a physical process. If a process (like a movie) is a thing, then yes, else no. It isn't an object. Not sure how you're making this conclusion of 'thing' based on what I post. — noAxioms

In terms of ontology, things have properties, processes do not have properties. You may have meant it in a de dicto sense. Regardless, we agree consciousness is a process.

Because consciousness is not physical, meaning has no physical properties...

Of course it has physical properties. It is the cause of physical effects. — noAxioms

You seem to be assuming consciousness is a thing. Physicalism does not require that; it may be that consciousness is produced by the physical in a manner analogous to a movie is produced by the rapid projection of a series of still images. We can refer to the movie as if it is an object, but it actually is not. My hypothesis is that consciousness entails the rapid change from one static brain state to the next. This would be no more detectable than a movie: brain states can be detected, but not the subjective experience they create.

The reason that the mind is not an object like those of physics or chemistry is because it is what we are. The mind (observer, subject, consciousness) is the one utterly indbuitable fact of existence because it is that to whom all experience occurs. — Wayfarer

You assert the mind is not an object, and therefore "not in the frame". And yet, it is a fact that I exist, I am an observer, a subject, and I engage in mental activities. "The mind" is conceptually that aspect of myself that engages in mental activities. Reconcile this.

Now the entire phenomenological, idealist, Indian, and most contiental philosophy understands this in a way that Anglo physicalism cannot.

And for you, that's just an inconvenient detail, — Wayfarer

To claim these philosophical perspectives "understand this" implies you have identified some objective fact. You have stated no facts that need to be accounted for. You've discussed an alternative, incompatible paradigm that depends on vague concepts.

You say you accept science, but science is reductive. You need to explain how your vague concept of "the mind" fits into a universe that is otherwise completely physical. You also need to reconcile how the functions of this non-object "mind" are influenced by the physical (drugs, brain disease, trauma...), and how the mind can have causal efficacy with the physical aspects of the body.

So the issue remains: how can feelings be accounted for?
Physics of course, which is how they're accounted for if physicalism is true. — noAxioms

Are you referring to physics, as a scientific discipline?

It's possible that feelings depend on some aspect of physical reality that only manifests in sentient beings. Physicists would never be able to detect its existence.

There's nothing in what I say that is 'anti-science' or 'opposed to science'. The only thing I'm opposing, is the application of scientific method to philosophical problems. — Wayfarer

Do you regard Inference to Best Explanation as "scientific method"? That's all I've done.

You see, I think your approach is undermined by this reductionism, the conviction that basic physical level is the only real one, to the extent that you can't even consider any alternative. You simply assume that philosophy must defer to physics, as if that can't even be in question. — Wayfarer

I do not "defer to physics". Physics provides a set of facts. A metaphysical theory needs to be able to account for all facts, including (but not limited to) the facts physics presents to us.

If explanation bottoms out in simples, yet consciousness and cognition are inherently gestalt-like, ... — Wayfarer

Whoa! Did you actually make a positive claim? Do you indeed believe the mind is irreducible? Or is this one of those noncommital possibilities (you did say, "if"). What about everything other than mind? You said you accept science.

If you think the mind is irreducible, how does it come into existence?

A Turing machine can't create the experience of "redness".
— Relativist
If physicalism is true, then the machine very much can. So your assertion amounts to a claim that physicalism is wrong, but apparently expressed as opinion, not as something falsified. — noAxioms

Good point, but it means your Turing machine question doesn't further the analysis.

A Turing machine could produce feelings if (and only if) the machine's initial state includes the capacity to exhibit feelings. Feelings can't be programmed into existence. So the issue remains: how can feelings be accounted for? I offered 2 possibilities: illusionism and some otherwise undetected aspect of reality.

You reference simulation in your op. This amounts to a zombie: one could simulate a human that appeared to behave like a human in all ways, but it would not experience feelings because the machine lacks the capacity for them. For example, the machine could detect the wavelengths of reflected light, and identify "red", and react just as we would. But that't not experiencing the quale as we do.

I hold that there is a mind independent of space and time, but that it is present in the world through being hosted by the brain (and the body). — Punshhh

Why do you believe that? What's your justification? What you describe sounds like dualism - is that indeed your position? Are you familiar with the interaction problem?

I embrace physicalism (generally, not just as a theory of mind) as an Inference to Best Explanation for all facts.
— Relativist

Except for the nature of mind and the felt nature of experience, right? You’ve acknowledged that in various places as I understand it. — Wayfarer

Then you misunderstood. I was open to an alternative that might be a better explanation for the "hard problem", but you didn't offer one. That's why I kept asking for more than the "negative fact" (not physicalism).

Try to understand this in terms of seeking an Inference to Best Explanation: that "negative fact" explained nothing. As I said then, it merely opened up infinitely many possibilities. But also, if anything is possible then it's also possible that there is an unknown natural solution - one that may even be inaccessible to scientific analysis. This is a dramatically smaller explanatory gap than leaving all possibilities open.

Some physicalists (including Armstrong) insist that all questions about the natural world will one day be discovered by science. I do not share that optimism. We may never determine the true ontology of the QM "measurement problem". String theory may be true, but it is empirically unverifiable. But there could easily be other aspects of reality that are beyond our capacity to explore. This rationalizes the assumption that the explanatory gap has a natural solution. I acknowledge this as a weakness, but it's minor compared to the alternatives.

You aren't even in position to justifiably disagree, because you don't embrace any particular theory of mind (much less, a metaphysical theory).
— Relativist

That is a virtue as far as I’m concerned. — Wayfarer

Withholding judgement is always a respectable position. But you should be consistent and also withhold judgement on physicalism: it's not provably false; it has a great deal of explanatory power, and it's consistent with what we do know about neurology and the natural world.

Although I make a judgement, I don't rule out the possibility I'm wrong. It's odd that you rule out the possibility I'm right.

Yes, I'm aware that you believe the mind is not physical, and therefore not on par with physics and chemistry. But the extent of what you told me you believe about mind is just this negative (supposed) fact: it's not physical. This means you answer no positive questions, account for no aspects of reality, so it's logically impossible for this singular negative fact to constitute a better explanation for reality (including, but not limited to, mind) than a comprehensive metaphysical theory.

I also do understand that you don't have much interest in a general metaphysical theory, and I'm fine with that. But you haven't grasped that this means you aren't positioned to judge my inferrence to best explanation. Instead, you seem to think that your objections to a physicalist account of mind are so objectively strong that no well-informed, rational person could fall for it.

For clarity’s sake do agree with this depiction of materialism by D M Armstrong?



Might help to understand what is meant by physicalism. — Wayfarer

I hadn't seem this post when I gave my prior reply.

I mostly agree with it, but have a problem with the terminology.

Regarding a definition, I recall that you quibbled with the definition of "physical". "Naturalism", as I defined it, dispenses with the semantics debate.

But being disposed to do or say something merely describes what someone ls likely to do. It doesn't describe what they ought to do. — Wayfarer

Not merely "likely" - it's a certainty, given the right conditions. As I said, an "ought" is a belief/disposition. Believing that you ought to pay for your groceries (rather than steal them) will result in your paying for your groceries, unless other factors are present (eg you're hungry and destitute).

More generally, this directly relates to "free will". Physicalism entails compatibilism: any choice you make will be the product of deterministic forces, a set beliefs (dispositions) that are weighed by the mental machinery, and can only produce one specific result. In hindsight, it only SEEMS like a different could have been made. In actuality, no other choice could have been made, given the set of dispositions that existed when the choice was made. So the collective set of dispositions necessarily leads to whatever choice that is actually taken.

This comes off as arguments from incredulity.
— Relativist

That definitely cuts both ways. — Wayfarer

No, not in the context of our discussion. I'm not trying to persuade you that physicalism is true. I was satisfied to agree to disagree, for reasons I had stated. But you refused to do that, and could not respect my position because you were confident you could demonstrate physicalism is false. My only task is to defend the reasonableness of my position. Your insult "disposed" me to continue the conversation, even after you stopped responding.

This dam is a perfectly satisfactory, save for the hole in it.'

Comment on the Armstrong passage above. If you think it's right, what is right about it? If you think not, what is wrong with it? — Wayfarer

I already did:

However, all theories of mind have problems. Those problems tend to be glossed over, or given ad hoc explanations (when one abandons naturalism, one feels free to entertain any magic that is logically possible). But that cannot result in a theory that is MORE plausible than physicalism*, on the basis of its one problem and its speculative solutions. You aren't even in position to justifiably disagree, because you don't embrace any particular theory of mind (much less, a metaphysical theory). — Relativist

*Perhaps you forgot: I embrace physicalism (generally, not just as a theory of mind) as an Inference to Best Explanation for all facts. You can defeat this only by providing an alternative that better explains the facts.

Can you demonstrate that feelings cannot be programmed into a Turing machine? I outlined a simple way to do it in my OP. — noAxioms

There's much I agree with in your op, but I don't see anything in it that suggests the qualia "redness" or "pain" could be created through computation.

A Turing machine can't create the experience of "redness". It could compute the conditions that give rise to it, and the aspects of the world that it represents. But if you have a solution, I'd be interested in hearing it.

Physicalism gives you causal accounts of how neurons fire, how circuits activate, how information gets processed. None of that touches the normative structure of logical reasoning—the “oughts” built into validity, soundness, and necessity. — Wayfarer

This is an outdated objection to physicalism. Here's the boilerplate response:

"Oughts", intentions, and beliefs are dispositions. Being disposed to do X, means that under suitable circumstances, the individual will do X. X can be a thought.

Logical reasoning is guided by dispositions (beliefs) about entailments, conjunctions, disjunctions, etc.

I understand that, but it is too simplistic an example to support the contention. The simple association of words with sensations hardly amounts to a model of language. — Wayfarer

Model of LANGUAGE?! Are you seriously suggesting that if I can't provide a bottom up account of the development or grasping of a language model, that this falsifies physicalism? That's ludicrous.

The fact that language can be interpreted by AI is sufficient to demonstrate that language is consistent with physicalism. Language doesn't mean anything to a machine- that's the one genuine difference, and that's why I focused on meaning. Incidentally, AI can engage in logical reasoning.

Instead of trying to falsify physicalism, you seem to be simply providing reasons why you are unconvinced. This comes off as arguments from incredulity.

As I told you, I'm not trying to convince you of anything. I embrace physicalism because it's the best explanation for all facts (including, but not limited to, science facts). Any mental behavior that is consistent with an algorithmic approach is consistent with physicalism. As I've admitted, feelings are not algorithmic- they are the sole, legitimate issue. They still don't falsify physicalism, but it's a legitimate problem. However, all theories of mind have problems. Those problems tend to be glossed over, or given ad hoc explanations (when one abandons naturalism, one feels free to entertain any magic that is logically possible). But that cannot result in a theory that is MORE plausible than physicalism, on the basis of its one problem and its speculative solutions. You aren't even in position to justifiably disagree, because you don't embrace any particular theory of mind (much less, a metaphysical theory).

It's a matter of picking the least problematic. Or not picking at all. — bert1

:100:

You are both describing a philosophical zombie, — Punshhh

I've been discussing the role of feelings - the qualia that zombies lack. My position is that this is the only serious problem for physicalism, but also that it doesn't falsify it.

I'm aware of 2 ways feelings can be accounted for:
1) illusionism - this means feelings are not directly physical because they exist exclusively in the mind- a mental construction. It depends only on mental causation (which I've defended). It also accounts for the action of pain-relievers, which mask the pain by interfering the brain's construction of the sensation.

2) Feelings are due to some aspect of the world that has not been identified through science, and may never be. This is open-ended; it could be one or more properties or things.

Why should anyone consider these? Every theory of mind has some problem, such as the interaction problem of dualism. Physicalism is the theory that is most consistent with everything we do know through science about the mind-body relationship. More significantly: physicalism is consistent with everything else we know about the world - outside of minds.

My point was: 1) that most aspects of consciousness can be described algorithmically- this is what materialist philosophers of mind do.
...
2) on the other hand, feelings cannot be created via algorithm.
— Relativist
It's a parallel process, but any parallel process can be accomplished via a Turing machine (presuming no weird reverse causality like you get with realist interpretations), so I disagree, the operation of any physical system at all (if it's just a physical system) can be driven algorithmically.
So your point 2 is one of opinion, something to which you are entitled until one starts asserting that the statement is necessarily true. — noAxioms

I am a physicalist, but I see no reason to believe feelings could be programmed into a turing machine, unless we treat feelings as illusions: a belief that the sensation is real, along with the behavioral reactions it induces. An alternative is that there is some aspect of the world that manifests exclusively as the feelings we experience. I'm open to other possibilities. Do you have something in mind?

Please notice what you are glossing over or assuming in saying this. Philosophers have spent millenia puzzling about the relationships between mind, world and meaning, here you present it as if it is all straightforward, that all of this can simply be assumed. Which is naive realism in a nutshell. — Wayfarer

Your response expresses a judgement, but fails to specify what you think I failed to do. Your burden is to show that some aspect of mental processing cannot possibly be grounded in the physical. In this instance, you were suggesting that logical reasoning cannot be accounted for under physicalism. I was merely explaining why I think it can. If you think this inadequate, then explain what you think I've overlooked. If there's insufficient detail, I can explain a bit more deeply.

My argument is that physicalist philosophy of mind conflates physical causation with logical necessity. — Wayfarer

You didn't give an argument, you simply noted that physical causation and logical necessity are different, and that you apparently assume that a physical mind could only "reason" in a manner that is directly attributable to physical cause/effect. THAT is naive.

Computers can do logic. They don't do it the same way humans do, but it nevertheless proves that physical processes CAN do logic. One important distinction between humans and computers is that the statements that we apply logic to, have meaning to us. I outlined a physicalist account of meaning. I also noted that logic is nothing more than semantics, and that fact also pertains to meaning.

So what is it, exactly, that you think cannot possibly be accounted for physically?

As for your 'pain' example...It is an extremely basic account which attempts to equate intentional language with physical stimulus and response. A dog will yelp if it stands on a hot coal, but a dog yelp is not a word. And regardless, it fails to come to grips with the point about 'multiple realisability', against which it was made. — Wayfarer

What I was trying to get across is that meaning is grounded in our interactions with the world (and in our physical structure). In this case, the true meaning of pain is the unpleasant sensation. Attaching a word to it seems trivial to account for physically (relating memory of a sound sequence to a memory of a sensation).

I addressed multiple realizabilty by pointing you at another post I made that described criterial causation (a physical process) to account for mental causation. I suggest that mental causation is the key, because it entails functionalism: it is the function of a mental state that matters, not the physical manifestation of that functional state.

You have previously acknowledged that memories depend on the physical brain, as evidenced by memory loss due to disease and trauma to the brain. Surely you don't think that 2 people with a shared experience have their memories manifested identically in their respective brains. They wouldn't need to- they just need to provide the same functionality (e.g. recall of images, events, sounds...).

because the same mental state can be realised by indefinitely many different physical structures, the mental state cannot be identical with a physical state — Wayfarer

Non-sequitur. A mental state is a functional state; any physical structure that produces the same function can therefore produce that mental state.

Pain' is also utterly inadequate as an example, because it completely fails to come to terms with the intentional and semantic structure of language. — Wayfarer

Invariably, I address a specific issue you bring up, you fail to acknowledge that I addressed it, and bring up a related issue outside the scope of what I was addressing.

In this case, I was simply giving an example of how meaning is attached to experience, in this case: a sensory experience. In this particular case, pain is clearly linked to intentional behavior: it's an experience to be avoided.

Meaning and intentionality are generally considered the more challenging to account for. Semantic structure seems trivial, because it's simply something that is learned.

The philosophical implication is that while physical causes explain physical events and processes, logical necessity defines the rules for how we can reason and establishes unavoidable truths (like 2+2=4 or geometric axioms) that hold regardless of any physical event. — Wayfarer

Sure, but logic is semantics - it is not some aspect of the world. It applies to statements, not to things. Truths are statements that correspond to reality, These "defined rules for how we reason" consist of applying precise definitions to certain words.

1. If language mirrors only the contingent physical process rather than the necessary logical content (the final, valid definition), the statement equates the psychological fact of concept acquisition with the logical structure of the concept itself. — Wayfarer

It is not the case that language mirrors "only the contingent physical process". I said it mirrors the mental processes. The concept of "true" seems perfectly straightforward - a recognition that a statement corresponds to (say) what is perceived, vs a statement that does not.

It's notable that I countered 100% of your claims — Relativist
Only in your own mind. — Wayfarer

Of course! But you haven't rebutted my counters in your responses. Mostly, your objections reflect either: a misunderstanding of physicalism (e.g. conflating with science), a lack of imagination (failing to figure out a physicalist account might address your issue), or an attempt to judge it from an incompatible framework (e.g.the way you treat abstractions). When I've addressed these, you do not respond directly, then you sometimes repeat the countered claim in different words. So that's why I feel I've countered your claims. Here's the latest example in which you seem to have overlooked or misunderstood what I was saying about "meaning":

To treat a brain state as having meaning (as representing a proposition) or logical order (as representing a valid step in an argument) is to already inject a non-physical, intentional, or normative element into the physical description to assign semantic content to to a physical state. — Wayfarer

A brain state does not have meaning. I never claimed it did. Here's what I said:

Meaning entails some connection to our instinctual reactions to elements in the world and within ourselves. You and I both feel pain when we grab a hot pan. We cognitively relate the word "pain" to this sensation, so it's irrelevant that our respective neural connections aren't physically identical (i.e. the "meaning" is multiply realizable). — Relativist

You might have asked for clarification or pushed back, but instead you made a claim that was nowhere close to what I'd said.

On further thought, as you often say that I'm engaging in speculation or unthethered philosophizing uninformed by science, could you point exactly to where I'm doing that? — Wayfarer

I don't insist you depend on science, but rather that you develop and utilize hypotheses with some epistemic justification in mind. For example, if you were to suggest that a thought were an ontological primitive - you'd need consider how you would eventually justify the claim. One way to do that would be to work toward a more complete, coherent metaphysical theory that includes that hypothesis.

You're not doing that here. It's reasonable to point to the gaps in our scientific understanding of the physical processes involved with reasoning. Kudos for not using this as a basis for an argument from ignorance against physicalism, at least not in this post. I assume it's obvious to you that physicalism isn't falsified by gaps in our scientific knowledge.

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We're going in circles here. Bottom line: logic is not physical nor can be reduced to physical forces and categories, but I'm not going to press the point further. We've been arguing since Nov 5th 2024 - I remember the date, because it was the eve of the US Presidential Election, I see no purpose being served by continuing. — Wayfarer

You have established that you have no rational basis to claim physicalism is falsfied. All you've done is to to reify an abstraction ("logic") and assert that this reification cannot be reduced to "physical forces".

The APPLICATION of logic entails process. Computers operate by applying logic, and this demonstrates that APPLYING logic is consistent with physicalism.

As I previously discussed, the abstract concept "logic" is describable in language. That language mirrors the mental processes involved with defining/learning the concept. When we use the word ("logic") we are drawing on the memory of those mental processes by which we mentally connected the word to the concept.

It's notable that I countered 100% of your claims, and of course - you don't see it, and instead dismissively assert that we're going around in circles. We go in circles because your thinking about these issues is within the framework of your own internalized paradigm (your personal, subjective "mind-dependent world"). You are essentially attempting to falsify the physicalist paradigm on the basis that it's inconsistent with your own. You have not, and cannot, falsify physicalism this way. And in case you forgot, this is the burden you gave yourself - that you could show physicalism cannot be true. I don't expect a reply, but I do suggest that you accept the fact that you cannot actually falsify it or at least that you cease asserting that you can. You don't need to falsify it to reject it. Both acceptance and rejection of a "theory of mind" paradigm entails subjective judgement, and since I understand this, I would never suggest one is irrational for disagreeing with my judgement.

"Wayf doesn't accept that conscious activity can be reduced to neural correlates"

Nothing profound or wrong going on there. Maybe the gripe is with people who seem to think materialism is provable. That seems to me, demonstrably not the case (and perhaps, demonstrably not possible). But that doesn't actually make it untrue. Its awkward. — AmadeusD

I beg to differ. The position that "conscious activity cannot be reduced to neural correlates" is a strong claim- it implies impossibility. My position is that there's no basis to claim it's impossible ("not impossible" is a modest claim).

I would certainly not claim that "materialism is provable", but I believe I can provide a reasonable justification to believe in materialism. In brief: as a metaphysical theory, it is a Inference to Best Explanations for all available facts about the world. Every known phenomenon is consistent with it, and it most parsimoniously accounts for these facts. One could reject this, on the subjective grounds that we know too little to draw a conclusion, but I don't think there's a defeater.

there's an implicit conviction, again. that science provides the court of adjutication for philosophy. — Wayfarer

You're reading that into it. Stephen Hawking and Richard Dawkins have said something along these lines, but they aren't philosophers. I have not asked for defenses on empirical (or scientific) grounds. I've asked for any kind of justification.

the capacity to grasp reasons, recognise valid versus invalid inferences, and understand causal relations as relations is categorically different from the physical processes described by neuroscience. — Wayfarer

Sure, it's categorically different - but this doesn't entail an immaterial ontological grounding. Process is categorically different from existents, but grounded in the physical.

Physicalism, naturalism, and materialism generally seek to naturalise cognition in terms of evolutionary theory and neuroscience. — Wayfarer

You're conflating the philosophy with the science. Science indeed fails to account for all aspects of mind, but science is limited to what humans have figured out. Philosophical materialism/physicalism is broader - it's as free of the human limitations of scientific investigation as any metaphysical theory. It is limited only by what can be deemed material/physical.

even if human reason is not magical, it is extraordinarily uncanny. To think these 'featherless bipeds' descended from homonim species that evolved capturing prey on the savanahs over thousands of millenia are now able to weigh and measure the Universe. — Wayfarer

Sure, it's extraordinary (given our limited knowledge of the steps and the mechanisms), but this is insuffficient grounds to conclude there was anything unnatural involved. There's much we don't know, may never know. This doesn't mean we should emulate our ancient ancestors and assume supernatural forces are involved.

I have indeed considered it, and this is precisely where the argument from multiple realisability bites. Even if you can verbally describe a concept, the physical or neural realisation of that concept can vary enormously. This isn’t an incidental feature — it’s structurally unavoidable.

A single sentence can be expressed in English, Mandarin, Braille, Morse code, binary, or handwritten symbols, and the meaning is preserved across all of these radically different physical forms. That shows that meaning is not identical with any one physical instantiation. — Wayfarer

All languages are descended from a common, early langauge. But more significantly, they are all grounded in our common structure (sensory/cognitive/emotional/hormonal...). Meaning entails some connection to our instinctual reactions to elements in the world and within ourselves. You and I both feel pain when we grab a hot pan. We cognitively relate the word "pain" to this sensation, so it's irrelevant that our respective neural connections aren't physically identical (i.e. the "meaning" is multiply realizeable).

So the fact that we can describe a concept verbally doesn’t help your claim — it actually illustrates why semantics and reasoning can’t be reduced to any one class of physical patterns. The level of explanation is simply different. — Wayfarer

Strawman. It's irrelevant that the relevant connections can be realized in multiple physical ways.

And this is precisely where the significance of universals shows up. Feser says 'A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once.' — Wayfarer

Sure, mental objects are private. But we have nearly identical capacities to recognize patterns, and to apply words to these patterns, and thus to communicate with each other about them. Our respective mental images of the world have a lot in common because our neurological structures have a lot in common. Plus, the patterns are REAL! Humans have developed concepts and language to refer to them. This doesn't imply the mental objects have objective existence; it just means there are real patterns that we can name, describe, and learn to idealize.

physical processes are governed by causal relationships; reasoning is governed by norms of validity. The latter can't be reduced to the former. — Wayfarer

Non sequitur. Peter Tse proposed a neurological model he calls "criterial causation", that would account for mental causation with multilple physical realizability. I discussed it in this post.

Tse's model may be wrong (it's not verified science), but it shows you're wrong to say "the latter can't be reduced to the former. It indeed can.

Of the large number of possibilities which one could theoretically come up they can be arranged into two groups, those where there is a mental origin, or ones where there is a non mental, or physical, origin. These categories are derived from the two things we know for sure about our being, 1, that we are, have, a living mind and 2, there is a physical world that we find ourselves in. If you can provide an alternative to these two, I would like to know. — Punshhh

And yet, some people seriously entertain solipsism and idealism - because they are not provably impossible. This is the sort of thing I'm complaining about. I'm fine with the focus you suggest.

When it comes to philosophical enquiry into our existence, philosophy is mute, blind, it can’t answer the question. — Punshhh

This tells me you are not a theist. Philosophically minded theists often think they can "prove" God's existence through philosophical analysis. Debating these issues is what drew me to learn a bit about philosophy.

I’m not going to talk for Wayfarer, but the impression I had was that the philosophical interpretation of the physical world (including our scientific findings) is what he takes issue with. — Punshhh

Actually, he accepts science. His focus seems to be philosophy of mind. He takes issue with materialist theory of mind. Issues SHOULD be taken with it, but I object to declaring materialism (in general) false on the basis of the explanatory gap, while meanwhile taking flights of fancy (mere possibilities) seriously.